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ABSTRACT 
Maintaining a competitive advantage in conflict requires a Marine Corps that can 
rapidly develop and field technologies to the operational forces. In the 2019 
“Commandant’s Planning Guidance,” the Commandant of the Marine Corps emphasized 
the need to enhance our capabilities in artificial intelligence, sensor-based data collection, 
and data-enabled decision-making. Vital to this effort is the Risk Management 
Framework (RMF), the mandated process by which we assess and mitigate cybersecurity 
risks to these systems in the rapidly evolving threat environment. To maintain its 
effectiveness, the Marine Corps must continue to make process improvements that 
support the rapid development of secure systems. This study conducts a qualitative 
analysis of the Marine Corps’ utilization of the RMF to determine whether current 
assessment and authorization processes adequately address the current 
threat environment in a timeline that supports the warfighter. We use a mixed-
methods approach to investigate the successes, shortfalls, and inefficiencies of the 
RMF through the experiences of interviewed subjects involved in the Marine Corps 
assessment and authorization process. We find that the current Marine Corps 
assessment and authorization process is slow, stovepiped, and compliance-
based. The increasing requirement to develop and field new technologies to the 
operational forces and the evolving nature of security threats require the Marine Corps 
to improve its risk mitigation strategy. 
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In July 2019, General David Berger, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
issued his Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) to the force. Within this 
transformative document, General Berger lays out his vision for the Marine Corps as we 
depart from more than 20 years of combat in the Middle East, he reorients the force toward 
countering the expansion of Chinese influence and military power in the Pacific as well as 
the advancing cyber capabilities of our competitive adversaries. Of particular interest and 
in a stark contrast from the status quo, General Berger places particular emphasis on our 
need to invest in emerging technologies to maintain our competitive advantage in combat. 
He writes, “we must prioritize research, development, and fielding of emerging and 
advanced technologies that are applicable within the seaward and landward portions of the 
littorals. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, additive manufacturing, 
quantum computing, and nanotechnology will continue to change the world - we must be 
positioned to capture the returns on investment” [1]. To realize a competitive advantage 
from these technologies, the Marine Corps must analyze the current policies and 
procedures that guide the development and implementation of information systems (IS) 
and operational technology (OT) to increase the speed and efficiency that emerging 
technologies are fielded to the warfighter.  
Marine Corps IS and OT are subject to threats that can have devastating effects on 
operations, equipment, and personnel. Additionally, these threats pose a significant risk to 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. The Federal Information 
Security Modernization Act (FISMA) requires that all Department of Defense (DOD) IS 
go through a formal authorization process prior to operation and after major modifications 
that affect the security posture of the system [2]. To maintain compliance with federal law 
and DOD policy, the Marine Corps requires authorization of systems that operate within 
the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) environment and these systems are 
reviewed annually to confirm the effectiveness of assigned security controls and their 
implementation. After years of utilizing the Risk Management Framework (RMF) to guide 
the assessment and implementation of security controls for Marine Corps systems, 
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experience has shown that the assessment and authorization process can take upwards of 
18 months. This requirement has a significant, negative effect on the speed of 
implementation of information systems and operational technology. Maintaining a 
competitive advantage through use of emerging technologies requires the Marine Corps to 
iterate faster on technology development and the fielding of systems to the warfighter, to 
do so at greater speed than our adversaries, and without compromising our security posture.  
This thesis explores the effectiveness and efficiency of the Marine Corps’ 
utilization of the RMF to achieve an authorization to operate (ATO). Our research seeks to 
answer two main questions: (1) Are the Marine Corps RMF processes and tools adequate 
to meet the current and future needs of the Marine Corps?  (2) What effect do the Marine 
Corps’ assessment and authorization (A&A) policies and processes have on the speed of 
implementation and security of information systems? Through an analysis of semi-
structured interviews with Marine Corps program offices and members of the Marine 
Corps cybersecurity work force who play a role the A&A process, we explore which 
aspects provide overall benefit to the Marine Corps’ development and implementation of 
information technologies and those that hinder our ability to obtain or maintain an 
advantage over our adversaries. 
The objective of this research is to conduct an analysis of the Marine Corps’ 
utilization of the RMF to determine whether current A&A processes, training, and staffing 
are adequate to accurately identify controls and mitigation strategies for Marine Corps IS 
on the MCEN in a timeline that supports the warfighter. The selected controls and strategies 
must balance the benefits to mission against risks driven by constantly evolving 
cybersecurity threats. This research investigates the successes, shortfalls, and inefficiencies 
of the RMF through the experiences of interview subjects with respect to A&A of IS in the 
Marine Corps. Specifically, we seek to understand if gaps in knowledge, manpower, and 
training exist among personnel who are responsible for executing the process. We also seek 
to understand whether the intended objectives of the Marine Corps A&A process are 
realized in the actual execution of the process by PMs and the Marine Corps’ cybersecurity 
work force, or whether a disconnect exists between them. Although we intend to analyze 
broadly the effect of current staffing of Marine Corps cybersecurity work force personnel 
3 
on RMF efficiency, this research does not include a business case analysis of Marine Corps 
manpower management for cybersecurity professionals.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
Understanding the current state of the Marine Corps’ assessment and authorization 
process for IS requires understanding the evolution of DOD programs that led to the RMF. 
In 1972, DOD Directive 5200.28, “Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing 
(ADP) Systems,” laid the groundwork for standardizing the minimum-security 
requirements for automated information systems. In the 1980s, described as the era of 
trusted computing, the Department of Defense published the Rainbow Series standards for 
information security. Prominent among these standards was DOD 5200.28-STD “DOD 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria” (the “Orange Book”) first published in 
1983  and updated in 1985 [3]. Over the following decade, the DOD continued to revise its 
policies as the Department’s use of automated IS continued to expand. In December of 
1997, the DOD formalized its Certification and Authorization (C&A) process for 
information systems with the promulgation of Department of Defense Issuance (DoDI) 
5200.40, “DOD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process” 
(DITSCAP). A representation of the DITSCAP phases is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. DITSCAP Phases. Source: [4]. 
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As DoDI 5200.40 states, “The objective of the DITSCAP is to establish a DOD 
standard infrastructure-centric approach that protects and secures the entities comprising 
the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII). The set of activities presented in the 
DITSCAP standardize the C&A process for single Information Technology (IT) entities 
that leads to more secure system operations and a more secure DII. The process considers 
the system mission, environment, and architecture while assessing the impact of operation 
of that system on the DII” [4]. DOD IT “refers to all DOD-owned IT or DOD-controlled 
IT that receives, processes, stores, displays, or transmits DOD information” [5]. Figure 2 
illustrates the many types of systems that fall under the broad definition of DOD IT. 
DITSCAP served as an important step in the C&A of information systems. DITSCAP was 
the first standardized process that viewed systems as part of a network infrastructure. 
Previous processes focused solely on the security of each individual system without the 
greater context of the environment within which it operated. Furthermore, under the 
DITSCAP regime, all DOD IT systems require assessment, but only certain categories of 
systems require authorization before deployment. 
 
Figure 2. Taxonomy of DOD Information Technology Assessment and 
Authorization Criteria. Source: [5]. 
In the post-9/11 era, DITSCAP was unable to address service-specific information 
security requirements, nor was it able to properly address the Defense Information Systems 
Agency’s (DISA) Ports, Protocols, and Services Management initiatives of the early 2000s. 
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In addition, DITSCAP lacked a single source for standardized security controls that would 
facilitate the services and other federal agencies to take a unified approach to security. To 
maintain cohesion with the NSA’s new approach to security, DISA began developing a 
new framework for securing Federal information systems called the DOD Information 
Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP).  
A. DIACAP 
In 2006, DISA developed a replacement for the DITSCAP framework that enabled 
the DOD to maintain compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act 
of 2002, which required all federal agencies to “develop, document, and implement 
information security programs for systems and information within each agency” [2]. 
Additionally, FISMA tasked the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
with “responsibilities for standards and guidelines, including the development of standards 
to be used by all federal agencies to categorize all information and information systems 
collected or maintained by or on behalf of each agency based on the objectives of providing 
appropriate levels of information security according to a range of risk levels;  guidelines 
recommending the types of information and information systems to be included in each 
category; and minimum information security requirements (i.e., management, operational, 
and technical controls), for information and information systems in each such  
category” [6]. These standards and guidelines are published as Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS). FIPS, and other NIST publications, form the standards used 
by U.S. Government agencies outside the FISMA-designated category of “national security 
systems” (NSS), which includes DOD ISs and many ISs in the intelligence community and 
other agencies. FISMA requires standards for NSS to be developed by the Committee on 
National Security Systems (CNSS), operated by the NSA. For harmony across government 
agencies, CNSS often adopts NIST standards; we focus on relevant NIST standards as a 
result, noting explicitly where DOD or CNSS policy requires derogation from widely 
applicable standards. 
The DIACAP framework adopted the use of information assurance controls, 
developed by the NSA and NIST, to manage information systems across the DOD. 
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DIACAP followed a multi-step, iterative process to identify and assign information 
assurance controls based on an analysis of the system. This analysis includes determining 
the type of information system, the Mission Assurance Category (MAC), Confidentiality 
Level (CL), required baseline IA Controls, and the controls needed to augment the baseline 
to meet specific security requirements for the type of information stored, processed, or 
transmitted.  
 
Figure 3. DIACAP Activities. Source: [7]. 
Although FISMA mandated compliance with FIPS 199, “Standards for Security 
Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems,” and numerous NIST 
special publications, there was still discretion within the broad-scope guidance that enabled 
agency-specific solutions to achieve compliance. These variations in implementation had 
a negative effect on federal agencies’ ability to share information across IT systems, and 
thus reduced the capacity to leverage reciprocity among systems. In response, the 
intelligence community started an initiative to synchronize its information security 
processes with the DOD. From this effort, the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative 
(JTF-TI) [8] was formed and comprised of members from the DOD, Office of the Director 
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of National Intelligence (ODNI), NIST, and CNSS. The Task Force began examining the 
existing NIST publications as the basis to produce a unified information security 
framework.  
Additionally in 2006, NIST codified the baseline security requirements in the 
release of FIPS 200, “Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 
Information Systems” [9]. This publication mandated the use of the updated NIST  
SP 800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems,” to 
provide a standard approach to security controls across government organizations. A more 
comprehensive list of laws and regulations that guide the RMF process are provided in 
Appendix A. 
The revised controls within SP 800-53 detail the most current safeguards and 
strategies to secure information systems and are reviewed annually by NIST to ensure the 
most relevant and effective controls are implemented. Figure 4 illustrates the differences 
between SP 800-53 controls and the legacy controls. To date, there have been four revisions 
to the original SP 800-53 demonstrating the continuously evolving threat to security and 
privacy for IS. As federal agencies began implementing standardized controls across 
systems, the JTF-TI Working Group began establishing a more unified C&A framework 
to improve security and risk management strategies. The JTF-TI Working Group’s efforts 
resulted in the transformation of DOD IA policies and practices to align with the shifting 
government risk management policies and practices. In 2013, President Obama signed 
Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” [11], tasking 
NIST with developing a cybersecurity framework through coordination with federal 
agencies and leaders of cybersecurity best practices in the private sector. In an extension 
of the Executive Order, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) revised Circular 
No. A-130 [12] in 2016. The Circular promulgates federal policy for information 
management and codifies the shifting view of security and privacy as compliance 




Figure 4. Improvements to NIST SP 800-53 Controls. Source: [10].  
B. RMF  
NIST, in its partnership with the DOD, ODNI, and CNSS, began transitioning 
DIACAP to the new cybersecurity framework, referred to in U.S. Government use as the 
“Risk Management Framework” (RMF) as tasked by the Executive Order. The goal was 
to “improve information security, strengthen the risk management processes, and 
encourage reciprocity among federal agencies” [13]. The transition to RMF shifted the 
focus from compliance checks to new approach that focuses on effective management of 
risk in diverse environments. Changes from the DIACAP security framework include: 
replacement of MAC and CL determinations with Impact Value and Security Objective 
assessments to synchronize language with NIST recommendations and Intelligence 
Community practices; replacing DOD-defined security controls with updated DOD 
guidance regarding the assignment, validation and implementation of SP 800-53 controls 
to align with NIST and the intelligence community; and transitioning the C&A process to 
an A&A process [8]. 
The RMF was designed to facilitate the protection of IS by guiding program offices 
(PO) to identify and incorporate security controls throughout the system development life 
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cycle (SDLC) [14]. Through continuous monitoring and annual security reviews, program 
offices can maintain situational awareness of the security posture of systems authorized to 
operate on DOD networks. The RMF also provides detailed information on the risk 
associated with the implementation and use of systems to Authorizing Officials to enable 
authorization to operate decisions [14]. Until a system receives a full or interim 
authorization, it cannot be connected to the MCEN or any other DOD network In a 
presentation titled “DIACAP to RMF Transformation Brief” [8], the DOD Cybersecurity 
Policy Directorate provided a list of benefits to several different stakeholders within the 
DOD. Although more than ten benefits to the transition were cited, there are two categories 
that are of particular interest to this research: speed and security. The Cybersecurity Policy 
Directorate asserts that the RMF will provide more rapid deployment of solutions to the 
warfighter and will provide greater assurance that systems are secure. Although these were 
the anticipated benefits prior to the implementation of the RMF, this work assesses whether 
the RMF has assisted the DOD in realizing these goals, or whether further process 
refinements are required. Additionally, there is sufficient reason to question whether the 
RMF has made significant improvements to the security of our systems. It can be argued 
that RMF has improved standardization of controls across the services and increased the 
granularity at which the DOD assesses, categorizes, and selects security controls to 
mitigate risk. However, it may be the case that security risks might be mitigated only by a 
combination of controls or that controls that appear to fix one risk might cause another to 
emerge. Further, the nature of what a control is designed to prevent might not be clear when 
it’s evaluated on its own instead of as part of a system. Our study will seek to determine if 
the RMF has made a direct improvement on the security of our systems or whether such a 
claim is baseless given the subjective nature of the process and the lack of empirical metrics 
by which to measure security. 
1. RMF Process 
The RMF process consists of seven steps that parallel the SDLC used by program 
offices. The NIST SP 800-37, “Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to 
Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach,” guidance is flexible on what order each step 
12 
should be implemented, as long as security risk is managed and all requirements are 
met  [14].  
 
Figure 5. Marine Corps RMF Process. Source: [15]. 
NIST SP 800-37 Rev.2 (2008) defines the seven RMF steps as follows: 
Step 0: Prepare  
The first step in the RMF is administrative in nature but establishes an important 
foundation for the following activities. In this step, system owners take a holistic view of 
the system to identify stakeholders, system assets, types of information, and information 
life cycle management. A risk assessment is conducted to identify the vulnerabilities of the 
system. This is used to prioritize assets based on the severity of impact if information was 
lost or compromised [14]. Additionally, this step determines where the system should be 
fit within the overall enterprise architecture and allocates security and privacy requirements 
used to guide and inform follow on steps of control selection and implementation. System 
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owners decide how the system will connect to other systems within the established 
enterprise architecture based off security requirements to guide and inform follow on steps 
of control selection and implementation.  
Step 1: Categorize System  
In this step, the system is categorized by impact levels determined from the results 
of  the security analysis conducted in Step 0 with respect to the security objectives of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In conjunction with NIST special publications, 
the CNSS Instruction (CNSSI) 1253, “Security Categorization and Control Selection for 
National Security Systems” [16], provides amplifying guidance for National Security 
Systems (NSS) and takes precedence where conflicts arise with SP 800–53. 
Figure 6 shows an example of the CNSSI 1253 “Security Control Table” used to 
categorize systems based on the security objectives, assigning an impact value of low, 
medium, or high for each of those objectives. In the table, “x”s annotate NIST security 
controls by impact value and the “+”s annotate additional CNSS security controls by 
impact value [16]. Controls can be tailored to align to individual systems depending on 
environmental conditions. The results of this process are included in the security plan and 
used to develop overlays.  
14 
 
Figure 6. Example Security Control Table. Source: [16]. 
Key tasks initiated or completed by the end of this step include categorization of 
the system in accordance with CNSSI 1253, development of the Initial Security Plan, and 
updating the security categorization and system characterization information with the 
requisite DOD component cybersecurity program. 
Step 2: Select Security Controls  
Once the system is categorized, controls are selected in accordance with the impact 
value (high, medium, low). The system owner can select a generic baseline of controls that 
specifically address a certain “group, organization, or community of interest” [14] or 
customize controls due to requirements. Within SP 800–53, there are more than 900 
controls and enhancements that can be selected to apply to IS.  
Key tasks for this step include common control identification, selection of security 
controls, developing an organizational level monitoring plan to verify technical controls 
are in place, review and approval of the Security Plan, continuous monitoring strategy, and 
application of security overlays for unique characteristics of the system [14].  
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Step 3: Implement Security Controls 
In Step 3, the security controls identified in the previous step are implemented for 
the system and organization. Control implementation is documented in a baseline 
configuration [14].  
Key tasks for this step include implementing control solutions and documenting 
that implementation in the Security Plan.  
Step 4: Assess Security Controls 
In Step 4, the security controls are evaluated to ensure they are implemented 
operationally, and the system is working as intended. This assessment is conducted by the 
Security Control Assessor (SCA). Subsection D.1 provides a description of personnel roles 
and responsibilities within the Marine Corps’ A&A process. Following the assessment, the 
SCA makes recommendations of approval to the Authorizing Official (AO).  
A key deliverable of this step includes development and approval of the Security 
Assessment Plan, Security Control Assessment, preparation of the Security Assessment 
Report (SAR) and initial remediation actions [14].  
Step 5: Authorize System 
In Step 5, the organization’s AO makes a final determination on the authorization 
of an information system. The program office will submit a Security Authorization Package 
to the AO that will include the Security Plan, SAR, and Plan of Action and Milestones 
(POA&M)[14]. This package allows the AO to conduct a risk analysis and make an 
educated decision on whether to authorize the system to operate on the network. 
Step 6: Monitor Security Controls 
The objective of Step 6 is to determine if the security controls that were selected 
and implemented on the information system remain necessary and effective. If the 
environment the system operates within changes, or there are changes to hardware or 
software that affect the security posture of the system, the system must undergo a 
reassessment. Updates are reflected in the Security Plan, SAR, and POA&M as needed. 
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Otherwise, the system will continually be monitored throughout the remainder of the 
SDLC.  
2. Reciprocity 
Two of the drivers highlighted in the shift from DIACAP to the RMF were a greater 
standardization of processes and increased information sharing across Federal agencies, 
the intelligence community, and the DOD. Reciprocity, as described in Marine Corps’ 
Enterprise Cyber Security Manual (ECSM) 018, is “the mutual agreement among 
participating enterprises to accept each other’s security posture in order to share 
information” [15]. Leveraging security assessments from like systems not only provides a 
more rapid understanding of the environment within which the system will operate and a 
reduction in duplicated work, it can also have meaningful impacts on the speed of 
implementation of systems. This is especially useful when scaling ISs or OT across 
networks and platforms. For reciprocity to be leveraged effectively, there must be 
standardization with respect to assessments, security controls, auditing, and supply chain 
risk management. The DOD’s ability to leverage reciprocity can often be limited by the 
degree to which categorization, security control implementation, and documentation are 
conducted uniformly across organizations. The RMF is inherently an interpretive tool and 
discretion is given to the Services to execute the framework within the bounds of applicable 
directives, policies, and statutes. Since reciprocity decisions reside at the AO level, the AO 
has sole discretion as to whether a prior RMF assessment/authorization will be accepted 
reciprocally. Through our interviews, we seek to understand the degree to which 
reciprocity was leveraged in any given process, and the amount to which it reduced rework 
and the timeline for authorization. Conversely, if reciprocity was not sought or was denied, 
discovery and analysis of these factors may provide useful information for future A&A 
policy refinements.  
C. MARINE CORPS ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION PROCESS 
The latest version of the ECSM 018, “Marine Corps Assessment and Authorization 
Process (MCAAP),” was published in June of 2020. ECSM 018, is the principal policy and 
resource document that outlines the techniques and procedures for the authorization of 
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Marine Corps systems and networks. The MCAAP implements the RMF to maintain 
compliance with applicable Federal laws and regulations as well as DOD, Department of 
the Navy (DON), NIST, and Marine Corps directives, instructions, and manuals [15].  
The MCAAP provides a standardized A&A structure by which IS and OT are 
assessed and authorized to preserve the cybersecurity posture of the environment within 
which the system will operate. The MCAAP utilizes a tiered management structure to 
identify and mitigate risks to individual systems and the MCEN, as well as monitoring 
residual risk throughout the program life cycle. In addition to Marines serving as program 
managers (PM), commanders, and user representatives (UR), the Marine Corps 
cybersecurity work force plays a prominent role in the development, routing, and approval 
of authorization packages (AP). The members of this civilian work force serve as subject 
matter experts within MCAAP for the assessment and mitigation of risks to developmental 
and existing IS. The delineation of roles and responsibilities within MCAAP is important 
to understanding the context of the experience of the interview subjects. While some roles 
are situationally dependent (e.g., PMs, URs), the roles executed by the Marine Corps 
cybersecurity work force are appointed based on certifications and experience. The 
MCAAP describes the roles and responsibilities involved in the process, the majority of 
which were interviewed as part of this study.  
1. Roles and Responsibilities 
We list the MCAAP roles below. Their assigned responsibilities within the Marine 
Corps’ A&A process are outlined in the ECSM 018: 
a. Authorizing Official (AO)  
The AO is a member of the Marine Corps cybersecurity work force and is 
a senior management official or executive with the authority to formally 
approve the operation of an IS at an acceptable level of risk. Through 
authorization, the AO assesses system risk for the IT control environment 
at the organizational, mission, and business process levels, including 
consideration of non-USMC systems that may affect financial reporting and 
operations, and accepts the network and system risks of operating in a 
specific environment. The Marine Corps has one Service AO, designated as 
the Marine Corps AO, residing at the Intelligence, Command, Control, 
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Communications and Computers (IC4) Division in the Office of the Deputy 
Commandant for Information (DCI). 
b.  Service Security Control Assessor (Service SCA)   
The Service SCA is responsible for ensuring and overseeing a qualified 
certification cadre (e.g., Security Control Validators (SCVs) also known as 
Marine Corps Validators, Functional Security Controls Assessors 
(Functional SCAs), and Security Control Assessor Analysts (SCAAs). The 
Service SCA provides technical expertise in the preparation and during the 
conduct of comprehensive security assessments based on the managerial, 
operational, and technical security requirements documented within the 
Authorization Package (AP). 
c.  Functional Security Control Assessor (FSCA) 
Functional SCAs are members of the Marine Corps Cybersecurity Work 
Force and are officials acting under the authority of, and on behalf of, the 
Service SCA or the AO. FSCAs identify, source, and implement system 
security requirements on ISs in the acquisition process to provide an 
acceptable level of risk to the Marine Corps AO. FSCAs also conduct a 
comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-technical security 
features of a system. This includes providing assurance that vendor products 
used by the ISs have been assessed and authorized, and vendors who 
develop, store, transmit, or are otherwise involved with Marine Corps 
systems are subject to the same or higher standards mandated by the Federal 
Government and DOD.  
d.  Security Control Validator (SCV) 
The SCV is an unbiased trusted agent who provides verification and 
validation implementation of the system’s assigned security controls and 
safeguards incorporated through the security engineering process. The 
Marine Corps SCV is responsible for testing the implementation of 
applicable cybersecurity controls for an assigned system. Validation 
includes the development of appropriate test procedures, execution of test 
procedures, and the accurate documentation of a system’s security posture 
based on the validation results and residual risk. Validation is applied 
throughout the life cycle of an IS to confirm or establish by testing, 
evaluation, examination, or investigation that an ISs assigned security 
controls are implemented correctly and effectively. 
e.  Program Manager (PM)  
The PM coordinates all aspects of the system from initial concept, through 
development, to implementation and system maintenance. The AO, SCA, 
Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM), SCV, and User 
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Representative (UR) provide advice, information, and guidance to the PM 
throughout the authorization process. The PM’s function is to ensure that 
the security requirements are integrated in a way that will result in an 
acceptable level of risk when operated in its intended environment. 
f.  Information System Security Manager (ISSM) 
The ISSM is the individual responsible to the AO for the Cybersecurity 
Program of Marine Corps ISs within a particular organization. The ISSM is 
responsible for the cybersecurity program of a DOD IS and for ensuring 
compliance to the Marine Corps A&A program. An ISSM will be assigned 
to support a PM to deliver a Program of Record (POR) with cybersecurity 
integrated throughout the SLDC or be assigned to a command to perform 
the day-to-day system security oversight responsibilities, including A&A of 
operational networks and systems. The ISSM is responsible for the selection 
of security controls based on the system’s security categorization.  
g.  Information System Security Officer (ISSO) 
The ISSO is a member of the Marine Corps Cybersecurity Work Force and 
is responsible to the ISSM for ensuring that the appropriate operational 
cybersecurity posture is maintained for a specific DOD IS or organization. 
h. Information System Security Engineer (ISSE) 
The Information System Security Engineer (ISSE) is a member of the 
Marine Corps Cybersecurity Work Force and is responsible for ensuring 
that the ISs information protection requirements are satisfied. ISSE 
responsibilities include: coordinate with the PM to ensure that all 
information protection requirements for the IS are identified, ensure the 
integration of the information protection requirements into IT acquisition 
processes through purposeful security design or configuration and built in 
to new IS releases, assist in the development of authorization packages for 
systems and programs in the developmental and acquisition process, and 
design the system to meet or exceed the information protection 
requirements based on security controls during RMF Step 3. 
i.  User Representative (UR) 
The UR represents the operational interests of the user community 
and ensures the IS meets the user needs. In the Marine Corps this 
responsibility will include representatives from Marine Forces Cyberspace 
Command (MARFORCYBER) or Operational Units G-3 or S-3. The UR 
must review the A&A documentation for compliance with the Mission 
Needs Statement or Initial Operational Capability Statement and for 
concurrence with the security features of the system. The UR has the 
responsibility for ensuring that the appropriate cybersecurity controls have 
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been identified, assigned, and validated so that the implementation of the 
cybersecurity controls meet user community needs. The UR will also 
identify and document any cybersecurity controls that interfere with or 
otherwise prohibit effective mission execution [15]. 
ECSM 018 provides descriptions of the authorization decisions that can be made 
by the AO. It is important to note that these authorization decisions do not last in perpetuity 
as described in Step 6 of the RMF. Authorization decisions can be modified at any time 
during the system life cycle. In most cases, these changes occur during the annual review 
of the IS authorization or in the event of required changes that affect the security posture 
of the system. 
Through a qualitative study, we seek to understand which aspects of MCCAST and 
the Marine Corps’ RMF process present the most significant challenges for Marines and 
the Marine Corps cybersecurity work force in achieving and maintaining an ATO. 
2.  Marine Corps Compliance and Authorization Support Tool 
The Marine Corps Compliance and Authorization Support Tool (MCCAST), 
described as “the only official workflow tool used for the RMF process” [15] by the Marine 
Corps, is the automated environment within which the cybersecurity work force manages 
the A&A process. While the Army, Navy and Air Force are currently using the Enterprise 
Mission Assurance Support Service (eMASS) tool, the Marine Corps is the only service 
using MCCAST. Additionally, there is no interaction between these two workflow tools. 
As stated in ECSM 018, “The tool was designed to provide dynamic data exchange, 
cybersecurity status (metrics) and FISMA reporting, vulnerability assessment 
management, and A&A status tracking. All Marine Corps A&A packages will be 
developed, processed, tracked, and monitored through the MCCAST” [15]. This central 
repository increases transparency in the Marine Corps A&A process, facilitates the flow of 
information among stakeholders at all levels, and generates the necessary control and 
compliance reports. Once the authorization package has been completed in MCCAST and 
reviewed by the SCV and SCA, the package is forwarded to the AO for an authorization 
decision.  
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Despite the utility and workflow efficiency that MCCAST provides internal to the 
Marine Corps, questions regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the Marine Corps’ 
the workflow tool remain. Specifically, what effect does the utilization of a separate 
workflow tool have on the Marine Corps’ ability to maintain awareness of joint capabilities 
and leverage reciprocity from across the DOD.  
D.  RELATED WORK 
Throughout the course of this study, we discovered several related works that 
analyze the current practice of risk assessment and security metrics. Existing research on 
cybersecurity assessment frameworks and their performance is limited, likely a reflection 
of the difficult and ambiguous nature of measuring security. The cybersecurity community 
has been unsuccessful in defining standard metrics for security. Currently, to assess risks 
to IS and OT, the DOD relies on the cybersecurity work force’s experience and judgement 
along with limited-scope structured threat analysis and standardized compliance checks. 
The work discussed within this section demonstrates other approaches for measuring 
security.  
1. Measuring Cyber Risk 
The DOD is one of many organizations working to develop and maintain secure 
systems. From global corporations to small businesses, these companies are seeking new 
and innovative ways both to assess cybersecurity risk and implement security measures to 
control risks and prevent losses. For example, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) have developed a platform that aggregates non-attributed cybersecurity 
defense and loss data from its customers using secure multi-party computation. The 
Security Cyber Risk Aggregation and Measurement (SCRAM) platform enables 
companies to analyze this anonymous data to understand the cybersecurity threat 
environment and make informed, targeted investments in their own security. In their study, 
de Castro et al. analyzed adoption rates of security controls against monetary losses from 
49 cybersecurity incidents and the security controls implicated in the loss [17]. Of 
particular interest, the study found that, “…although the firms in our sample have a high 
level of security adoption and sophistication, losses often come from defenses that are well 
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developed, adopted, and understood” [17]. The correlation between losses with well-
developed defenses led researchers to conclude that compliance-style checklists for 
security control implementation are insufficient for determining cybersecurity risk and the 
true security of the system or firm. The SCRAM platform provides a mechanism for 
reporting control failures and losses through the aggregation of data in a post-failure 
environment. In the case of the DOD A&A process, analysis is prospective in order to 
support authorization decisions. There is generally only limited utilization of cybersecurity 
data to inform future security reviews. The SCRAM platform (or a similar failure reporting 
mechanism) could be a useful addition to DOD C&A policies and processes. But to employ 
such a mechanism, the Marine Corps must first possess the capability to collect, aggregate, 
and analyze cybersecurity data from across the DOD and develop methods to disseminate 
this information among our program offices and cybersecurity work force.  
2.  DON RMF and Risk Analysis 
In a 2020, Heier and Morales analyzed literature on evaluating risk and the current 
state of risk analysis and mitigation within the DON with respect to the assessment and 
authorization of information systems in their Naval Postgraduate School thesis 
“Quantifying the Risk Management Framework.” This analysis found that, “…DON RMF 
is highly qualitative and lacks standardized definitions, measurements, metrics, and a risk 
assessment methodology. The qualitative approach of the current RMF is further 
complicated by the bias, heuristics, groupthink, inconsistency, overconfidence, and 
overestimation ensuing from subjective inputs manifested throughout the DON  
RMF” [18]. Additionally, they provided recommendations that address each step of the 
RMF aimed at reducing the subjective nature of current risk assessments within the DON 
and advocate for the DON to develop standardized security metrics. Research performed 
by Heier and Morales made important contributions by highlighting the difficulty the DON 
faces in evaluating risk to information systems. While their conclusion that “…quantitative 
measuring is a must for a successful RMF program” may prove useful in certain aspects 
(e.g., manpower, resource allocation, cost), it may still suffer from the same subjective 
evaluation as the current approach in assessing the security of an information system.  
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3.     Government Analysis: Compliance vs. Security 
In October 2018, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a 
review of DOD efforts to harden the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of its weapon systems. 
The following year, that review resulted in GAO report 19–128, “Weapon Systems 
Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities,” [19]. The 
report describes three main areas of concern: 1) The DOD has difficulty retaining the 
cybersecurity expertise needed to analyze cyber threats due to the disparate levels of 
compensation between the public and private sector; 2) the top secret security classification 
of many DOD systems prevent information from being shared for collective understanding 
and mitigation; and 3) an evaluation team has months to complete a system review whereas 
adversaries are not bound by any such development and contract timelines.  
In addition to these findings, the GAO report made two specific observations 
specifically related to the effectiveness of the RMF. First, the selection and implementation 
of security controls, by itself, is insufficient in determining whether a system is secure. The 
GAO report observed that tests demonstrated a significant disconnect between the abstract 
selection and implementation of security controls and something concrete, like the number 
and severity of issues identified during red-team exercises, and the security achieved. 
Further, the variation in strategy and methods for implementing security controls can  effect 
on actual security of the system.  
The report cited a system where the role-based access controls that were 
implemented could be subverted due to unencrypted internal system communication. 
Although appropriate user authentication controls from SP 800-53 were selected and 
implemented, the system’s design still allowed unprivileged users to gain privileged access 
by observing and harvesting administrator usernames and passwords from the unencrypted 
internal communications. That is, controls appropriate to mitigate one identified risk were 
insufficient because their efficacy relied on assumptions about the system’s design (i.e., 
encrypted internal communication) that weren’t true and wasn’t foreseen by the RMF risk 
assessment approach. In this case, unencrypted internal communications may not have 
presented a risk recognizable by the RMF control selection process but was key to the 
efficacy of user authentication controls. Second, a false perception of the actual security of 
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the system may exist within program offices for their respective program because of the 
compliance-based security control selection process within the RMF. The report states: 
Program Officials cited the security controls they applied as the basis for 
their belief that their systems were secure. For example, officials from a 
DOD agency we met with expressed confidence in the cybersecurity of their 
systems but could not point to test results to support their beliefs. Instead, 
they identified a list of security controls they had implemented. [19]. 
The report goes on to note that more senior officials believed security controls are 
“necessary, but not sufficient” and that penetration testing is a better assessment of system 
security than compliance tests and documentation. Although this assertion may be valid, 
there remains a concern presented by Herley in a publication titled, “Unfalsibility of 
Security Claims” [20]. Herley writes, “There is an inherent asymmetry in computer 
security: Things can be declared insecure by observation, but not the reverse. There is no 
observation that allows us to declare an arbitrary system or technique secure” [20]. 
Although the findings of the GAO report do not provide examples of Marine Corps-
specific inefficiencies in the selection and implementation of controls, the report 
demonstrates a broader viewpoint of personnel responsible for executing the RMF process. 
In their interviews with GAO, Program Officials made direct associations between the 
selection and implementation of controls and resulting system security; however, the report 
finds that this activity is more closely associated with compliance than with security. Since 
the GAO report did not specify the level of cybersecurity expertise, level of software 
development expertise, or the branch of service of their interview subjects, the relationship 
between work force perceptions of security and the cyber vulnerabilities could not be 
attributed directly to the Marine Corps.  
4. Credibility of Security Claims from Compliance 
Although the GAO makes a valid observation with respect to penetration test 
results, it is not entirely dissimilar from compliance testing. Penetration testing may suffer 
from the same one-sided error problem: if you find a problem in a red team exercise, a 
security concern has been identified and can be corrected. If a security concern exists but 
is not found by a red team exercise, this remains unknown and the concern persists, 
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possibly to be exploited by an adversary. Compliance is the same: if security controls are 
found to be missing, this can be remediated. However, if a compliance exercise confirms 
the implementation of controls as required, it does not necessarily follow that the system 
is secure.  
In a journal article published by Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
(PNAS), Herley describes this very concern stating, “…claims that any measure is 
necessary for security are empirically unfalsifiable. That is, no possible observation 
contradicts a claim of the form ‘if you don’t do X you are not secure.’ This means that self-
correction operates only in one direction” [20]. Herley argues that we can only assert that 
a system is secure if our measure for security is the success at implementing controls. He 
notes that current guidance and practices provided by NIST and Department of Homeland 
Security’s Cyber Emergency Response Readiness Team are “tips” and “best practices.” 
Herley suggests that because this guidance is not supported by empirical evidence and are 
not falsifiable, they are insufficient to make claims as to the true security of the system.  
Similar findings were published in 2020 in a paper titled, “Compliance Cautions: 
Investigating Security Issues Associated with U.S. Digital-Security Standards.” Stevens et 
al. found that,  “…when compliance standards are used literally as checklists — a common 
occurrence, as confirmed by compliance experts — their technical controls and processes 
are not always sufficient. Security concerns can exist even with perfect compliance” [21]. 
In their study, researchers conducted qualitative interviews with security auditors from the 
IRS, credit card companies, and energy companies to determine the effects compliance-
based standards on actual security. Of particular significance, the researchers also 
concluded that the lack of a defined mechanism for reporting security concerns with 
compliance standards prevented organizational and industry wide adoption of new risk 
mitigations [21]. When this issue is viewed in context of the Marine Corps’ A&A process, 
the lack of a defined feedback mechanism between user representatives and ISSMs or 
ISSEs may have a negative, service-wide impact on awareness and adoption of new 
security risk mitigations.  
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5.  Secretary of the Navy: Cybersecurity Readiness Review 
In acknowledgement of the increasing threat to the DON cyberspace domain and 
in the wake of several compromises of information; then Secretary of the Navy 
(SECNAV), Richard V. Spencer, directed a comprehensive review of the department’s 
cybersecurity posture. The Secretary of the Navy’s Cybersecurity Readiness Review, 
directed in the fall of 2018, was published in March of 2019. By contrasting the current 
state of the Department’s cyber policy, organization, authorities, and posture against the 
best practice of industry, the report made several salient observations with respect to 
training and retention of the cyber work force that are particularly relevant to our research.  
The SECNAV Cybersecurity Review went a step farther than the GAO report in its 
analysis of current processes for risk and threat analysis within the DON. The report 
observes that the DON lacks a unified approach to achieve cybersecurity resiliency. One 
example was the Navy’s use of the CYBERSAFE program to develop cyber hygiene 
standards—whereas the Marine Corps established its standards using the RMF. The most 
concerning however, is the lack of a process to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
controls in developmental and deployed systems. The report states, “DON has no uniform 
or effective cybersecurity metrics to quantify the threat, influence resourcing, or 
operational planning. There is no overarching means to assess DON’s risk to mission, lives, 
or future planning based on ongoing compromises” [22]. Without metrics to assess the 
effectiveness of cybersecurity controls and strategies, processes for mitigating risk and 
adversarial threats are relegated to a compliance-based approach rather than the threat-
based approach required of today’s dynamic, expanding threat environment.  
Through our interview study, we seek to determine if the issues identified by the 
review team in 2019 continue to exist today, and if so, what factors are preventing changes 
that will enhance our ability to deliver timely and secure capabilities to the warfighter.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This research takes a mixed-methods approach to understanding the utilization of 
the RMF within Marine Corps A&A. This approach combines a sequence of semi-
structured interviews, grounded theory analysis of interview content, and an analytical 
review of the cybersecurity certification literature. Through the administration of semi-
structured interviews and targeted requests for information from individuals involved in 
the A&A process, we identified areas of common experience that either contributed or 
detracted from the effectiveness and efficiency of achieving an ATO. We selected 
interview subjects with responsibilities for system ownership, acquisition, security or 
privacy management oversight, risk assessment, program implementation, and system 
monitoring. Using commercial software to transcribe each interview, we applied a 
grounded theory methodology [23], coding the responses of our subjects across interviews 
for comparative analysis. Chapter II presents an overview of the cybersecurity certification 
and assessment landscape, as well as our assessment of the literature evaluating the 
completeness and efficacy of these tools. Our aim is to identify patterns that will inform 
specific areas of policy and process refinement of the Marine Corps’ A&A process, in 
addition to areas in which training and education must be reinforced. 
A. OVERVIEW OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROCESS 
The data for this research was collected through a qualitative interview study [24] 
on individuals who hold roles and responsibilities within the Marines Corps’ A&A process. 
Through these interviews, we were able to understand and analyze the structure and process 
that we ourselves have not experienced. Through reliance on the experience of others in a 
variety of roles and with a variety of experiences, we construct a well-rounded view of the 
problem and undertake an exploratory approach to discovering the successes or areas of 
needed improvement that may be less evident from quantitative data. The human subjects 
aspects of this work were determined to be minimal risk by the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) of the Naval Postgraduate School as well as the Marine Corps Human Research 
Protection Program (HRPP) Office and the Marine Corps Survey Office.  
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The qualitative, semi-structured interview approach enabled us to tailor questions 
for each respondent with respect to the role(s) in which they served, adapting a structured 
interview guide to make best use of our time with each subject to elicit their specific 
knowledge and experiences. This allowed each respondent to provide more detailed 
answers and allowed us the flexibility to follow up on interesting remarks, asking for more 
examples, explanations, or discussions. The resulting data are thus also richer and more 
informative than a survey for our purpose of developing an exploratory understanding of 
the process and the space of potential interventions and improvements. 
We obtained a diversified sample of participants using snowball sampling [24]. 
Once a participant is identified and interviewed, that participant recommends other 
individuals that could provide personal experiences on the study topic. We then selected 
among the recommended individuals to build a sample satisfying our goal to diversify 
participants across roles, ranks, responsibilities, and points of participation in the A&A 
process. 
The interview guide was structured in six sections, establishing a uniform 
framework from which to analyze and compare shared experiences of the interviewed 
participants. The categories within each interview include Subject Background, ATO 
Experiences, Risk/Threat Assessment, Control Selection/Implementation, RMF Speed and 
Alternative Processes, and RMF Perceptions. Each interview lasted approximately one 
hour. 
Each interview began with the participant’s background information to gain insight 
on their affiliation with either the DOD or military, job or billet description, and any 
training they had received prior to utilizing the RMF process. Next, the participants were 
asked a series of questions related to their involvement and experience regarding the ATO 
process to include training experiences, risk assessment and control implementation for 
their specific program, and overall perceptions of the RMF process. Our intent for the 
interviews was to ask open ended questions that would solicit explanatory responses 
allowing for the greatest amount of information to be garnered in a one-hour interview. 
Although interviews were limited in time, multiple interview participants agreed to conduct 
follow-on interviews. As we gained insights from the experiences of interview participants, 
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we progressively narrowed the scope of follow-on interviews to illuminate specific areas 
for clarification and expansion.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The following questions serve as the foundation from which this study was 
developed. These questions were not used as the interview guide but instead provided the 
context by which the interview guide was developed.  
1. Do RMF processes and controls adequately address the current threat 
environment? 
2. Is the selection of controls determined based on achieving compliance with 
Marine Corps requirements or  on mitigating concrete risks identified by threat 
analysis? 
3. To what extent do RMF assessments aid or hinder the Program Manager, 
Security Control Validator, and Authorization Officer in certifying or accrediting 
the system? Why and how?  
4. Is the RMF equally capable of addressing threats to different types of DOD 
cyber systems?   
5. Is the training for program offices and Marine Corps cybersecurity work force 
members adequate to properly execute and oversee the Marine Corps RMF 
process? 
6. Are security concerns and attendant controls common across some or many 
Marine Corps information systems?  
7. Is the RMF being conducted by program offices and the cybersecurity work 
force or are contractors being used to conduct the process?  If so, why? 
8. What effect does the RMF process have on speed of implementation of 
information systems? Do alternative ATO processes provide a different timeline 
for implementation?  
30 
9. What changes would better facilitate a faster authorization process, while still 
maintaining or even improving the resultant security posture? 
C. DATA COLLECTION 
For this research, we conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with 25 
individuals:  both active-duty Marines and civilians. Our subjects were all members of the 
cybersecurity work force from various organizations within the Marine Corps. Participants 
had a wide range of experience, ranging from a subject with two years of experience in the 
Marine Corps only to a subject with more than 30 years of experience spanning three 
services and each of the information system assessment frameworks from DITSCAP to the 
current RMF. Our interview subjects include current and past PMs, ISSMs, ISSOs, ISSEs, 
SCVs, SCAs, and AOs, as well as current Marine Corps Data Systems Specialists who are 
serving in billets involved with the A&A process or penetration testing activities.  
Due to coronavirus-related restrictions, all interviews were conducted by telephone 
or video conferencing. The interviews were recorded, transcribed using the Dragon 
Professional speech recognition software, and analyzed under a grounded theory approach 
utilizing qualitative research software, ATLAS.ti. These software tools supported our 
ability to code and analyze the interview transcripts to extract common themes. 
Prior to the start of interviews, we obtained written and verbal consent from the 
participants and informed them of our intent to record the discussions for transcription 
purposes. Participants were encouraged to discuss their experiences with the RMF 
framework on past and present programs, highlighting both successes and points of 
friction. The interview guide, provided in Appendix B, was structured to illicit follow-on 
discussions related to our specific research questions. Our study does not identify interview 
subjects by name and quotations will not be attributed to the speaker.  
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IV. FINDINGS 
This chapter summarizes the reoccurring themes discovered through the conduct of 
semi-structured interviews described in Chapter III. The four themes identified include 
compliance, barriers to reciprocity, the MCCAST functionality, and personnel and training. 
A. COMPLIANCE 
RMF was designed as a dynamic process to better enable program offices to 
incorporate cybersecurity into their systems. To facilitate this work, ISSMs, ISSOs, and 
ISSEs are assigned to programs who then follow the guidelines and best practices 
developed by NIST and other agencies to mitigate security risks to IS and OT. 
We find that in an ideal scenario, IS security teams are in communication with 
program offices and the user representatives early in the design and development phase of 
the system to ensure that security requirements are incorporated from the beginning. 
Starting at Step 0 of the RMF process, security teams work with the user representatives 
and program offices to gain an understanding of the system, including: an understanding 
of the environment within which it will operate, the types of information it will store and 
process, and the placement of the system within the enterprise architecture. When 
complete, security teams move to Step 1 of the RMF process utilizing the CNSSI 1253, 
and NIST special publications to categorize the system to determine the impact value of 
each security objective with respect to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
system. The most important part of this process is the data and information that security 
teams use to make these categorizations. Subjects with less experience or in roles lower in 
the A&A hierarchy expressed a high level of confidence that categorizations identified at 
this stage adequately characterized security risks and that controls selected later to mitigate 
these risks would provide system-level security; by contrast, subjects with more experience 
or responsibility (i.e., those higher in the A&A hierarchy) expressed greater doubts about 
this relationship. One interview subject with many years of experience addressed this 
notion by stating, “Anyone that tells you that if you just do RMF, implement security 
controls, and the system will be secure will be way off the mark.”  
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Throughout the course of our interviews, we found that system categorization 
decisions rely heavily on CNSS instructions, the NIST publications, the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD), and the experience of the security team. The Marine Corps 
does not currently maintain its own repository of security concerns, or control 
implementations that are known to cause issues, or results of penetration testing of other 
systems. Therefore, this information does not exist for dissemination to security teams 
across the Marine Corps and cannot be incorporated into the development of current and 
future systems.  
Reliance on testing against NVD incidents and best-practice publications forces 
current practices into a compliance-based approach. While some systems undergo 
penetration testing by the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) 
Cyber Assessment Team or a Marine Corps Red Team, most systems do not receive this 
level of scrutiny. Indeed, one subject noted that “unless it is otherwise directed, we are 
really looking at performance and requirement-based testing.” Additionally, particularly 
with respect to the testing done by MCTSSA, an interview subject stated that the results of 
penetration testing are not promulgated to program offices, ISSMs, or SCVs for awareness 
or consideration. This information is only provided to the respective program office so that 
the vendor may make the necessary corrections or changes to the system, as required. The 
interview subject implied that this information is not made more widely available to protect 
the vendor from negative evaluations as a result of poor performance against security 
testing.  
We find a parallel aspect to this concern during the annual security reviews of 
Marine Corps systems. In addition to the lack of data from other systems, there is currently 
no feedback mechanism from users or user representatives directly to the ISSEs and ISSMs 
responsible for ensuring proper mitigation of risk for the respective system. If the program 
office lacks awareness of security concerns or fails to communicate this information to an 
ISSE or ISSM, it cannot be considered for security control modifications during the annual 
review. Several subjects indicated that the same user representative is often used for 
multiple systems within an organization which affects the level of detail and understanding 
the individual has regarding each system. As one interview subject puts it: 
33 
Often the challenge is finding who best fills the user representative role. 
According to the RMF process they are the ones that can most inform what 
types of data are present in the system and or processed by the system and 
that forms the basis for the rest of categorization and control selection… It 
is a challenge to find someone who can say this is what the system will 
really be doing. 
Currently there are no direct lines of communication between security teams and 
the system users. Security teams often conduct these reviews in the absence of user 
feedback. The resulting process becomes no more than a confirmation of the original 
categorization and control implementation. A current ISSM emphasizes: 
You pick a third of your controls based on your information system’s 
continuous monitoring strategy. That is subjective that we have determined 
how often these things should be analyzed. We run through a tabletop 
exercise to see if the plan is still applicable as is. We run some scans. Do 
your STIGs [Security Technical Implementation Guide] to make sure your 
stuff is running the same level if not better than the year before. 
Another interview subject noted the same activities but went on to acknowledge the 
reality of the effect of the annual review saying. The subject states: 
With the annual security reviews. We only do this once a year and they only 
review maybe 40 to 50 percent of the controls. That’s just the check to make 
sure that you do what you said you were going to do. That is the only point. 
As discussed by Herley [20], confirmation that the security control has been 
implemented does not mean the system is secure. The way in which security controls are 
implemented has a direct impact on the security of the system. Failure to implement a 
single control in a group of controls designed to satisfy a particular security objective can 
present a vulnerability. Further, only a portion of the total security controls are reviewed 
and tested at a time. If the security team is responsible for upwards of 10 programs at any 
given time, there will be multiple programs in the review process, simultaneously. Without 
the time or resources needed to conduct thorough security review of each system, the 
Marine Corps currently relies on the required scans and the conduct of a tabletop exercise 
to meet the requirement. 
If the Marine Corps is to improve its security control selection and implementation 
processes, we must collect and disseminate the findings of their penetration testing events. 
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This capability will also reduce the amount of rework and changes required of system 
security configurations to correct the same vulnerabilities. If we expand this concept across 
the DOD, we can not only increase the security posture of DOD systems but also reduce 
the time and labor-intensive processes required of the DOD cybersecurity work force.  
B. RECIPROCITY: BARRIERS TO UTILIZATION 
Two of the motivations for the transition from DIACAP to RMF were an increase 
in standardization of security controls and better information sharing across Federal 
agencies, the DOD, and the intelligence community. JTF-TI and NIST were largely 
successful in providing a unified framework for agencies and departments to approach 
cybersecurity risk assessment and mitigation. However, we find that the flexibility afforded 
in implementing this framework enables stovepiped processes under which assessments 
made by different services, agencies, and even programs are incomparable. This runs 
contrary to the goal underlying the development of the RMF and limits the Marine Corps’ 
ability to fully leverage reciprocity from like systems across the DOD. Subjects reported 
difficulty establishing security assessments through reciprocity. We identified three themes 
in the experiences these subjects conveyed. First, the interpretive nature of selecting and 
documenting security controls leads AOs to deny requests for reciprocity despite an 
existing, approved ATO in another service branch. The RMF attributes (e.g., subjective, 
interpretive) that enable the services to tailor the process in way that best supports their 
unique requirements are the same attributes create a barrier to the approval of reciprocity. 
Variations in the implementation and documentation of controls across services were 
frequently cited as the reason for reciprocity being denied. When asked about the degree 
to which the Marine Corps leverages reciprocity from other services, one interview subject 
acknowledged that: 
We really have had no problems accepting reciprocity from other services. 
Now the other way around, that’s a different story. We have had some issues 
where other services don’t want to accept our requests for reciprocity 
because of the way we do things a bit different. 
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Another subject expanded on this concern and provided additional insights into the 
disparities in documentation that negatively affect the acceptance of inter-service 
reciprocity: 
Reciprocity you would think would be easy. The services don’t require the 
same documents. We have different processes between them. We should be 
able to grab and use it from one thing to the next. Everything we do is 
different between the branches. You have to get an interpretation of what 
they said or what you are looking for. 
Second, inefficiency in routing a request for reciprocity extends timelines for 
achieving an ATO and injects uncertainty into the process. Interview subjects described an 
“all or nothing” approach to reciprocity that prevents the work force from utilizing the 
necessary aspects of approved ATO package to support approval of their own. One ISSM 
recommended routing partial or full requests for reciprocity earlier in the process to prevent 
timeline delays and the rework that a denial of reciprocity creates by stating, “we should 
be able to do a delta package that says, ‘Here are the differences [between the two 
packages]...are you willing to accept this.’”  
The AO is the final authority on reciprocity decisions. In the current process, ISSMs 
include documentation for requested reciprocity from other systems within the 
authorization package. If an ISSM includes a request for reciprocity in an authorization 
package, they will not receive a decision on the request until the package is reviewed and 
adjudicated by the AO. In the best case, the request for reciprocity is approved and the 
amount of time required to complete the assessment, selection of controls, and 
documentation is reduced. However, we found that this efficient result is not always 
guaranteed.  
Even when reciprocity is granted, there are still limited situations where ISSMs and 
their teams must still input each of the controls and documentation into MCCAST. Of note, 
in the cases where this requirement was made, reciprocity was approved from a system 
outside of the Marine Corps. Since the other services use eMASS and the Marine Corps 
uses MCCAST, despite the approval, the team still needed transcribe the documentation 
from eMASS to MCCAST. One interview subject described this scenario stating: 
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They have come back and said we need to put all controls in MCCAST. I 
was granted reciprocity but now I’m still taking all the info that’s already in 
eMASS and I’m putting it into MCCAST, one by one. And this includes all 
the mitigating [controls] and comments and that is a lot of work. 
Although this issue was identified only a few times in interviews, the relatively 
small size of our interview sample leads us to believe that this example of additional, 
MCCAST-specific work might contribute to a significant expenditure of resources across 
the Marine Corps. This issue is further complicated by the fact that the information 
transcribed into MCCAST is static. If the other service updates their authorization package, 
and the Marine Corps is not notified, the plan of action and milestones (POA&M) and other 
documentation becomes stale and there is currently no way to synchronize this information 
across systems. 
In the worst case, if the request is denied, the ISSM and their team must begin the 
RMF process over again: selecting, implementing, and documenting these same controls. 
In this case, the inability to leverage reciprocity results in significant delays due to the 
amount of new compliance work that must be completed despite the existence of an 
approved ATO elsewhere in DOD. This delay adds on to the months it can take for a 
package to progress through each approval step in the routing chain including the SCA, 
SCV, and AO. Additionally, while the package is being routed, the ISSM and their team 
cannot progress to the next steps of the RMF. Their progress is stopped, and in most cases 
the team will move on to another one of their other assigned projects. This uncertainty for 
ISSMs as to whether a reciprocity request will be granted provides a disincentive to 
leverage reciprocity. If ISSMs are unsure if reciprocity will be approved early in the 
process, and a denial would cause them to conduct all the analysis and documentation 
again, they are incentivized to produce authorization packets which are fully under their 
control, to minimize uncertainty at the cost of increasing workloads and delays prior to 
ATO approval.  
Finally, to leverage reciprocity in an authorization package, a reviewer must first 
be aware of like systems and understand the environment within which they operate, in 
order to understand if the previously granted ATO should apply in the scenario under 
review. Currently, there is no standard mechanism in place by which Marine Corps 
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cybersecurity teams can review ATO documentation for like systems across the DOD. The 
Marine Corps cybersecurity work force must either leverage contacts from the program 
office, rely on personal contacts within other services to seek information about these 
programs, or request access to eMASS to view the desired ATO package. Facilitating the 
cybersecurity work force in expanding their awareness of existing programs across the 
other services will serve to better enable Marine Corps integration with naval and joint 
force systems and operations. Furthermore, increased awareness of like programs, their 
respective operational environment, and dependencies will lead to reduced costs, timelines, 
and rework in the development and implementation of IS and OT.  
C. MCCAST: A STOVEPIPED WORKFLOW TOOL 
Proper execution of the RMF is a time and labor-intensive process that requires 
significant communication and teamwork between program offices, user representatives, 
and the cybersecurity work force. MCCAST is the Marine Corps’ sole workflow tool for 
the execution of the RMF within the A&A process. While MCCAST possesses many 
positive attributes including a digital repository for information including hardware and 
software data, system boundary tracking, diagrams, and POA&Ms; we find that it has 
numerous areas of needed improvement, limits efficient information sharing across the 
joint force, and is inconsistent with the CPG’s emphasis on naval integration.  
Currently, the MCCAST workflow tool does not support the communication and 
interaction with eMASS that is necessary to leverage reciprocity efficiently. In one ISSM’s 
opinion, “when you get to the actual interconnection between systems, it falls well short 
by not allowing me to specify who I need to inherit from or who I need to connect to.” 
Multiple ISSMs made recommendations for MCCAST functionality that would benefit to 
their efforts to leverage reciprocity. Several subjects who worked as ISSMs indicated that 
their efforts to leverage reciprocity would be greatly aided by adding a request function to 
MCCAST. The described function would enable information security teams to 
communicate directly with the respective program office from which the reciprocity is 
being requested. With the significant amount of time and effort it takes to complete an 
authorization package, we must take advantage of every opportunity to make their 
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processes more efficient. By reducing barriers to leveraging reciprocity and inheritance, 
we can reduce the amount time spent categorizing the system, selecting, and implementing 
controls, and satisfying documentation required to be completed by the cybersecurity work 
force.  
Similarly, participants expressed a need for a parent-child configuration within 
MCCAST to allow similar programs sharing a common set of controls with the same 
requirements to fall under one common ATO. A current ISSM gave one such example: 
If you have a system and you get an ATO for it and you want to deploy that 
somewhere, it is all or nothing. You’ve got  five VMs in there, that site 
needs to take and deploy all five. You can’t take one VM and put it into 
your system unless you do your own accreditation.  
With the push for units to deploy in small, specialized teams, there is no need to 
take unnecessary equipment and waste resources. This includes the processing power 
required to operate these emerging technologies. To facilitate this, program offices are 
trying to break apart and split up resources into smaller packages to better fit the size of 
deployed units. Without the parent-child relationship, participants reported conducting 
duplicative work on multiple packages all contributing to a delay in the ATO process. 
Establishing a policy for program offices to build and deploy packages under one ATO 
would greatly benefit both the program office and warfighter.  
While MCCAST does allow security teams to view other systems within the Marine 
Corps, the inability to view Navy ATOs demonstrates a disconnect with the Commandants’ 
emphasis on naval integration. Of note, there is an existing memorandum for reciprocity 
with the Navy. We view this memorandum as the short-term solution for the issues we’ve 
identified, and as such, the memorandum does not improve awareness of like systems and 
packages. We believe clear benefits remain in utilizing a common workflow tool. In 
addition to the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, DISA, and the Defense Counterintelligence 
and Security Agency (DCSA) also use eMASS, demonstrating how widely the lack of 
outside data in MCCAST limits the use of reciprocity and inheritance in Marine Corps 
ATO adjudication. Interview subjects were unable to provide a reason as to why the Marine 
Corps uses a separate tool to manage authorization packages. Interview subjects with 
previous experience using eMASS acknowledged that the tool has issues of its own, but 
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still believed the benefits of sharing a common tool outweigh those concerns. Further, 
eMASS is a well-established tool, sponsored by DISA and DOD Chief Information Officer 
(CIO), with the necessary support for sustainment including upgrades to its functionality 
in response to evolving requirements and new needs of the cybersecurity work force across 
the DOD. We find that despite any issues eMASS may have, the ability for ISSMs to share 
a common workflow tool with the rest of the joint force would promote information sharing 
(one of the original goals of developing the RMF) and provide greater awareness and 
efficiency in leveraging reciprocity and inheritance between existing ATOs and newly 
sought ATOs (another goal that motivated the development of the RMF).  
While increased functionality may provide significant benefit to the cybersecurity 
work force, IC4 does not currently possess the funding or capability to implement updates 
and changes to MCCAST, no matter how much such changes would improve current 
processes. Interview subjects explained that MCCAST is not a POR, and as such, does not 
have allocated funding for improvements or maintenance. ISSMs described the inability to 
make improvements for attaining an approval for reciprocity as a significant barrier to 
efficiency. Failure to ensure proper funding for sustainment of MCCAST—including 
capability to implement changes in response to evolving requirements—increases friction 
within the Marine Corps’ A&A process and thus injects unnecessary friction into the 
Marine Corps’ ability to rapidly develop and field technologies to the warfighter.  
D. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING: DOING MORE WITH LESS 
The increased need for advanced capabilities and technologies places significant 
responsibility on program offices and vendors to assess risk for their specific program. 
These individuals are not always cybersecurity professionals and often rely on DOD 
instructions, NIST publications, and user representatives to identify risks. At present time, 
the minimum requirements for Marines to become PMs is a Defense Acquisitions 
University (DAU) RMF certification (along with other training modules). While the 
training may be adequate to gain a high-level understanding of the RMF, cybersecurity 
knowledge has a smaller emphasis within this training. A PM discussing the challenges to 
gain an understanding of the Marine Corps A&A process admitted that, 
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They [Defense Acquisitions University] have a system online like 
MarineNet. Cybersecurity is mentioned in there but that is the extent of 
actual learning. You don’t retain much. It took me probably a year before I 
was really able to speak RMF and I don’t think I still can do a good job at 
it. I got to a point where I could finally understand what the ISSM was 
talking about. 
Many of the participants interviewed had to rely heavily on their ISSMs, vendors, 
and on-the-job training to gain a deeper understanding of cybersecurity risks and 
requirements. An active-duty Marine described his relationship with his program vendor 
in executing the RMF, conceded that he has to “truly rely on my vendor and ensure that 
the vendor knows what they are doing.” 
In several interviews, members of the cybersecurity work force indicated that 
Marine Corps does not possess the number of trained cybersecurity professionals required 
to meet its mission effectively. One interview subject observed: 
We don’t have enough people in program offices and acquisition offices to 
do all the stuff the stuff we are trying to get done […] We push ourselves 
into investing into a capability and ultimately after three or four years, it 
gets traction. 
This very situation was described with respect to the Conditions Based 
Maintenance Plus (CBM+) program. Despite the program having a detailed white paper 
and there being a direct reference to predictive maintenance within the CPG, due to lag in 
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle, the CBM+ program is not a POR. 
Because of this, the program is not being led by a program office and does not have a 
dedicated information system security team assigned. The responsibility for completion of 
the original Interim Authorization to Test (IATT) and the current efforts to attain a full 
ATO relies on the Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics’ (DC I&L) program 
lead and the respective vendor to complete the process. Although an ISSM from Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MCSC) is assigned to provide support to their efforts, this 
arrangement does not allow for support on a daily basis. The lack of timely process support 
has resulted in substantial timeline delays to a capability referenced in the CPG , directed 
by a white letter,  and is a current focus of effort of the DC I&L. We find that although this 
type of situation is more common outside of MCSC, the pace at which such systems are 
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being developed is overtaking the Marine Corps’ ability to put cybersecurity professionals 
against these requirements. Additionally, the current acquisitions framework and POM 
cycle does not support the rapid development and fielding of ISs and OT to the warfighter. 
These issues lead to information system security teams being assigned more programs than 
they have the time and resources to properly support. A current ISSM noted, “When I was 
with the Navy, I only had two to three programs at a time. Right now with the Marine 
Corps, I have double that number or more.” Although this research does not include a 
manpower analysis of the cybersecurity work force, this is an important consideration for 
future investment by the Marine Corps.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis explored the effectiveness and efficiency of the Marine Corps’ 
utilization of the RMF to achieve an authorization to operate (ATO) by focusing on two 
main questions: (1) Are the Marine Corps RMF processes and tools adequate to meet the 
current and future needs of the Marine Corps?  (2) What effect do the Marine Corps’ 
assessment and authorization (A&A) policies and processes have on the speed of 
implementation and security of information systems? To answer these questions, we 
analyzed several related studies on risk assessments and cybersecurity metrics and 
performed a human subjects study on participants in the Marine Corps’ A&A process, 
conducting 25 semi-structured interviews with Marine Corps cybersecurity personnel 
responsible for the execution of the RMF and A&A process. The chapter contains a 
summary of our findings and areas for future research. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND FINDINGS 
We find that the Marine Corps must improve its current compliance-oriented 
processes for assessing and mitigating cybersecurity risk, particularly in light of the 
evolving nature of security threats from adversaries. Evolving cybersecurity threats are 
poorly countered by a compliance-oriented process. Physical-world security threats and 
changing adversary behavior both drive new demands and evolving requirements to 
develop and field new technologies to the operational forces. Our findings suggest that the 
current RMF process hinders the Marine Corps’ ability to respond to both kinds of threat. 
Security assessments are conducted by program offices before systems are 
employed in practice with limited utilization of cybersecurity data to inform future security 
reviews. We find that these assessments require a substantial degree of interpretation by 
security assessment team, but also are heavily driven by a rigid compliance mentality and 
the need to satisfy long checklists of required security controls. Pre-employment testing 
and annual security reviews are generally focused on verifying implemented controls rather 
than performing careful analysis of the system’s security. As a result, we find that RMF-
driven security evaluation results do not correspond to the ability to make claims about a 
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system’s ability to resist compromise by an adversary. This is partly due to the natural one-
sided error of security evaluation [25]. It is also due to the fact that the RMF, as put into 
practice, focuses the attention of evaluators on functional testing of implemented controls 
rather than attempts to match real system risks (even those which are clear to the 
evaluators) to mitigating controls. 
Further, the Marine Corps has imposed unnecessary barriers to leveraging 
reciprocity, a regime under which security authorization and an ATO can be achieved by 
recognizing the evaluation of a system in a different context (for example, the same system 
deployed by a different service branch). The lack of common security control 
implementations and documentation standards across the services combined with the fact 
that the Marine Corps uses its own separate RMF workflow tool, that does not share data 
about ATOs or evaluations elsewhere in DOD, creates significant inefficiencies and 
precludes the benefits that reciprocity would provide. Using a Marine Corps-specific tool 
for the A&A of all emerging technologies for use on the MCEN and DOD networks should 
not be a contributor to inefficiencies in our processes. Funding and development support 
for MCCAST is vital to improving the speed and efficiency of delivering capabilities to 
the warfighter and the Marine Corps ability to iterate faster than our adversaries.  
The Marine Corps prides itself on doing things differently than the other services. 
While it may prove effective in other disciplines, this mindset has led the Marine Corps to 
create stovepiped processes and tools that prevent a unified cybersecurity effort across the 
DOD. This creates operational cybersecurity risk for the Marine Corps by limiting its 
ability to field emerging technologies rapidly and limiting the effectiveness of its 
cybersecurity assessment processes. If the Marine Corps is to maintain a competitive 
advantage over our adversaries, we must streamline our processes, leverage reciprocity to 
the greatest extent possible, and integrate the cybersecurity efforts of the joint force.  
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Our research has uncovered several areas of study for future researchers to consider 
that would provide a direct benefit to the cybersecurity posture of the Marine Corps.  
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(1) Limitations of Compliance-based Testing 
 The lack of awareness among the Marine Corps cybersecurity work force of 
vulnerabilities discovered by users and the limited capability to conduct penetration testing 
of Marine Corps systems has highlighted the degree to which control selection is driven by 
system categorization. Without the ability to conduct continuous monitoring, the Marine 
Corps requires a more robust and thorough approach to security. Future research can 
explore the degree to which the current compliance-based testing reflects the actual 
security of Marine Corps systems.  
(2) Proof of Concept for Improved MCCAST Functionality 
If the Marine Corps is determined to maintain a separate RMF workflow tool, 
efforts must be made to improve workflow and joint force integration to better support 
efficiency of interservice and Marine Corps internal reciprocity. Improved functionality 
would maximize the use of reciprocity and inheritance across the joint force and reduce the 
amount of duplicative work currently required of the DOD cybersecurity work force. 
Future work in creation of a proof-of-concept module for MCCAST that allows program 
managers the ability to link interoperable programs together and enable communication 
within the workflow tool would be a significant benefit to programs seeking reciprocity. 
(3) Quantitative Analysis of the Marine Corps Cybersecurity Work Force 
During the conduct of this research, ISSMs reported having as many as 10 systems 
within their portfolio at a given time. This means that in addition to working new ATOs 
for systems in the design and development phases, they are simultaneously conducting 
annual security reviews for systems with current ATOs. Further, there are programs in 
development phase that would benefit significantly from cybersecurity expertise, but do 
not have these critical personnel assigned. Questions to illuminate this issue include: 1) 
How many programs are assigned under each Marine Corps ISSM and SCV as compared 
to other services? 2) What are average times to complete RMF steps across like programs 
among each of the services? 3) Does the current USMC cybersecurity work force have the 
capacity to complete all the work it is given in the aggregate? Our research revealed a 
deficiency in trained and certified personnel in key positions, which is potentially leading 
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to long delays in programs receiving an ATO. Further analysis of the Marine Corps’ 
cybersecurity work force is needed to determine if it is sufficiently staffed to execute the 
Commandant’s intent.  
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APPENDIX A. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS 
NIST SP 800-12 Rev. 1, “An Introduction to Information Security,” describes the laws 
and publications that guide the use of the RMF: 
• The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 2002 was 
enacted as part of the E-Government Act of 2002 to address specific 
information security needs, which include, but are not limited to, 
providing: a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness 
of information security controls over information resources that support 
federal operations and assets; and the development and maintenance of 
minimum controls required to protect federal information and systems 
(as written in SEC. 301 of Public Law 107-347). 
• The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 was an 
amendment to FISMA that made several modifications to modernize 
federal security practices as well as promote and strengthen the use of 
continuous monitoring.  
• [Office of Management and Budget] OMB Circular A-130, 
Management of Federal Information Resources, requires that federal 
agencies establish information security and privacy programs 
containing specified elements. 
• FIPS 199 – Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 
Information and Information Systems, lists standards for the 
categorization of information and systems, which in turn provides a 
common framework and understanding of expressing security in a way 
that promotes effective management and consistent reporting. 
• FIPS 200 – Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information 
and Information Systems, specifies minimum security requirements for 
information and systems that support the executive agencies of the 
Federal Government as well as risk-based process for selecting the 
security controls necessary to satisfy the minimum-security 
requirements.  
• SP 800–18 – Guide for Developing Security Plans for Systems, 
describes the procedures for developing a system security plan, provides 
an overview of the security requirements of the system, and describes 
the controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.  
• SP 800–30 – Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, provides 
guidance for conducting risk assessments of federal systems and 
organizations. 
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• SP 800–34 – Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information 
Systems, assists organizations in understanding the purpose, process, 
and format of information system contingency plans (ISCPs) 
development with practical, real-world guidelines. 
• SP 800–37 – Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to 
Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach, provides guidelines for 
applying the Risk Management Framework to federal systems, 
including conducting the activities of security categorization, security 
control selection and implementation, security control assessment, 
system authorization, and security control monitoring. 
• SP 800–39 – Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, 
Mission, and Information System View, provides guidelines to establish 
an integrated, organization wide program for managing information 
security risk to organizational operations (e.g., mission, functions, 
image, and reputation), assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 
Nation resulting from the operation and use of federal systems. SP 800–
53, Security and Privacy Controls for Systems and Organizations, 
provides guidelines for selecting and specifying security controls for 
organizations and systems supporting the executive agencies of the 
Federal Government to meet the requirements of FIPS Publication 200.  
• SP 800-53 – Security and Privacy Controls for Systems and 
Organizations, provides guidelines for selecting and specifying security 
controls for organizations and systems supporting the executive 
agencies of the Federal Government to meet the requirements of FIPS 
Publication 200. 
• SP 800–53A – Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Systems and 
Organizations: Building Effective Assessment Plans, provides (i) 
guidelines for building effective security assessment plans and privacy 
assessment plans; and (ii) a comprehensive set of procedures for 
assessing the effectiveness of security controls and privacy controls 
employed in systems and organizations supporting the executive 
agencies of the Federal Government.  
• SP 800–60 – Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information 
Systems to Security Categories, assists agencies in consistently mapping 
security impact levels to types of: (i) information (e.g., privacy, medical, 
proprietary, financial, contractor sensitive, trade secret, investigation); 
and (ii) systems (e.g., mission critical, mission support, administrative). 
• SP 800–128 – Guide for Security-Focused Configuration Management 
of Information Systems, provides guidance for organizations responsible 
for managing and administrating the security of federal systems and 
associated environments of operation.  
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• SP 800–137 – Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations, assists organizations 
in the development of an ISCM strategy and the implementation of an 
ISCM program, which provide awareness of threats and vulnerabilities, 
visibility into organizational assets, and the effectiveness of deployed 
security controls [26]. 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Subject Background 
• What branch of service or DOD agency are you or were you affiliated with?  
o How long have you been a part of that agency? 
o Other affiliations? 
• Can you describe the role of your organization within that branch or agency?  
• What is your job or billet title? 
o Where does your position/billet fall within the hierarchy of your 
organization?  
• Can you describe the training you received prior to utilizing the Risk Management 
Framework? 
o Did you attend an in-person training or was it completed through an online 
tutorial? 
o Can you speak to your level of comfort with the process after you 
completed the training? 
ATO Experiences 
• Can you tell me about a time when you were involved with an ATO?  
o What was your role? 
o What authorities did you have within the process? 
o Who did you work with to complete the ATO process (more geared at 
process hierarchy)? 
• Were contractors used as part of seeking the ATO or did your team do all the work? 
o Why did you decide to use/not to use contractors? 
o What did you tell the contractors to do? 
o Who managed the contractors? 
o How did you know if they were doing a good job? 
 
• Can you describe the training you received prior to utilizing the Risk Management 
Framework? 
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o Did you attend an in-person training or was it completed through an online 
tutorial? 
o Can you speak to your level of comfort with the process after you completed 
the training? 
• Can you walk us through how you went about navigating the RMF?  
o Were there any steps of the RMF that cause significant delay as compared 
to others? 
o What aspects of the assess and authorize process are most time intensive? 
o How did you receive feedback throughout the RMF process and from 
whom?  
• How did you go about completing all the paperwork throughout the process? 
o Did you create or work from an existing template? 
o Can you speak to how you determined which controls were relevant to your 
program? 
• Was there a specific threat or security goal you (or your organization) were trying 
to mitigate?  
• At what stage, with respect to the development of the system, was the RMF 
conducted? 
o Do you think this was most useful or accurate time to conduct the RMF? 
o Can you describe when might be a better time to conduct this process? 
Risk/Threat Assessment 
• Can you describe how you went about assessing the risks or threats to your 
program? 
o Was the assessment risk, threat, or compliance based? 
o Who was responsible for conducting the assessment? 
o What methods were used to determine this assessment? 
o Did the assessment borrow from previously approved ATOs from similar 
systems? 
o Was there an effort to validate the assessment that was made? 
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• Were benefits of the system or mission relevance ever cited as a reason not to select 
or implement a particular control? 
Control Selection/Implementation 
• How did you ensure the selected controls were implemented? 
o Who was responsible for ensuring the selected controls were 
implemented? 
o What factors drove the selection of particular controls? 
 Compliance vs. the threat assessment 
• How was it determined that the selected controls adequately addressed the 
perceived risk? 
• Were you able use part of an ATO that was approved for a similar system? 
• Were you able to leverage risk mitigations inherited from the broader system or 
network? 
RMF Speed and Alternative Processes 
• Approximately how long did your ATO take? 
o How did you determine the beginning of the process? 
• What do you think took the most time in your ATO process? 
o Threat assessment/control selection/control implementation/paperwork/
intermediate or final approvals 
• If you had more resources, would that have helped speed up the process? If so, 
what resources? 
o Consulting vs. “in-house” expertise 
 
RMF Perceptions 
• Do you think the ATO reflects the security of your system? 
o Do you think your ATO reflects adequate security against new and 
evolving threats? 
• Have you heard of any processes or techniques for improving RMF speed/
efficacy? 
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o Did you consider using these alternatives in your project? 
o If not, what stopped you? 
• Would you like to provide any final thoughts regarding your experience with the 
RMF or attaining an ATO? 
o Potential topics for future research/improvement 
• Do you know any other individuals that might provide insights into utilizing the 
RMF? 
o Contact info 
55 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1]  Headquarters Marine Corps, “Commandant’s planning guidance,” United States 




[2]  Federal Information Security  Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–283, 
128 STAT. 3073. 2014 [Online]. Available: https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/
publ283/PLAW-113publ283.pdf 
[3]  “Department of Defense trusted computer system evaluation criteria,” Department 
of Defense, Washington, DC, USA, DOD 5200.28-STD, 2005 [Online]. 
Available: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/white-paper/1985/12/
26/dod-rainbow-series/final/documents/std001.txt 
[4]  “DOD information technology security certification and accreditation process 
(DITSCAP),” Department of Defense, Washington, DC, USA, DOD Instruction 
5200.40, 1997 [Online]. Available: https://www.acqnotes.com/Attachments/
DOD%20Instruction%205200.40.pdf 
[5]  “Risk management framework (RMF) for DOD information technology (IT),” 
Department of Defense, Washington, DC, USA, DOD Instruction 8510.01, 2020. 
[6]  “Standards for security categorization of federal information and information 
systems,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 
USA, NIST FIPS 199, 2004 [Online]. Available: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.199.pdf 
[7]  “DOD information assurance certification and accreditation process (DIACAP),” 
Department of Defense, Washington, DC, USA, DOD Instruction 8510.01, 2007. 
[8]  Cybersecurity Policy Directorate, “DIACAP to risk management framework 
(RMF) transformation.” Department of Defense, 2012 [Online]. Available: 
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/events/ispab-october-2012-meeting/documents/
ispab_oct2012_dcussatt_dod-rmf-transition-brief.pdf 
[9]  “Minimum security requirements for federal information and information 
systems,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 
USA, NIST FIPS 200, 2006 [Online]. Available: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.200.pdf 
56 
[10] “Security and privacy controls for information systems and organizations,” 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA, NIST 
SP 800-53 Rev. 5, 2020. doi: 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5. 
[11] Office of the President of the United States, “Executive Order -- Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.” 2013 [Online]. Available: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-
order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity 
[12] “OMB Circular A-130, Office of Management and Budget,” Washington, DC, 
USA, 2016 [Online]. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/
15057 
[13] “Risk management framework documentation, data element standards, and 
reciprocity process for national security systems,” Center for the Development of 
Security Excellence, Ft Meade, MD, USA, CNSSI 1254, 2016 [Online]. 
Available: https://rmf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CNSSI-1254.pdf 
[14] Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, “Risk management framework for 
information systems and organizations: A system life cycle approach for security 
and privacy,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 
USA, NIST SP 800-37r2, 2018 [Online]. Available: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-37r2.pdf 
[15] Headquarters Marine Corps, “Marine Corps authorization and assessment 
process,” United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, USA, USMC ECSM 
018, 2020. 
[16] “Security categorization and control selection for national security systems,” 
Committee on National Security Systems, Ft Meade, MD, USA, CNSSI No. 
1253, 2014 [Online]. Available: https://www.dcsa.mil/portals/91/documents/ctp/
nao/CNSSI_No1253.pdf 
[17] L. de Castro et al., “SCRAM: A Platform for Securely Measuring Cyber Risk,” 
Harv. Data Sci. Rev., 2020, doi: 10.1162/99608f92.b4bb506a. 
[18] M. I. Heier and A. J. Morales, “Quantifying the risk management framework,” 
M.S. thesis, Dept. of Info. Sciences, NPS, Monterey, CA, USA, 2020 [Online]. 
Available: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/65543 
[19] Chaplain, Christine T., “Weapon systems cybersecurity: DOD just beginning to 
grapple with scale of vulnerabilities,” Washington, DC, USA, GAO Report No. 
GAO-19-128, 2018. 
[20] C. Herley, “Unfalsifiability of security claims,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., vol. 113, 
no. 23, 2016, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1517797113. 
57 
[21] R. Stevens et al., “Compliance Cautions: Investigating Security Issues Associated 
with U.S. Digital-Security Standards,” presented at the Network and Distributed 
System Security Symposium, San Diego, CA, 2020. doi: 10.14722/
ndss.2020.24003. 
[22] Office of the Secretary of the Navy, “Cybersecurity readiness review,” 
Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, USA, 2019 [Online]. Available: 
https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002301997/-1/-1/
1/cybersecurityreview.pdf 
[23] Y. Chun Tie, M. Birks, and K. Francis, “Grounded theory research: A design 
framework for novice researchers,” SAGE Open Med., vol. 7, Jan. 2019, [Online]. 
Available: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2050312118822927 
[24] R.S. Weiss, Learning From Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative 
Interview Studies. New York, NY, USA: The Free Press, 1995. 
[25] C. Herley and P. C. Van Oorschot, “SoK: Science, Security and the Elusive Goal 
of Security as a Scientific Pursuit,” in 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and 
Privacy (SP), San Jose, CA, 2017, pp. 99–120. doi: 10.1109/SP.2017.38. 
[26] “An introduction to information security,” National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA, NIST SP 800-12r1, 2017. doi: 10.6028/
NIST.SP.800-12r1. 
58 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
